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1

Overview: current debates in critical social theory
The Pleasure Island File
All documents are copyright The Walt Disney Company. Due to the
unusual nature of these items, bibliographic references have been improvised.
["Adventurer's Club Show Schedule"]. 4"x6" card.

''History." 2 page.s
"Pleasure Island." 4 pages. Press release dated May, 1989.
"Plf'.!asure Island Chronology." 2 pages.
''Pleasure Island/Disney Village Marketplace Directory." Map.
[Pleasure Island Plaques]. 27 total. Transcriptions dated 24 March, 1989.
11

'Pleasure Island' Set to Open Spring of 1989." 6 pages.

"Pleasure Island: The Unauthorized History, By Jasper W. Linedozer, Semi·
Official Pleasure Island Historian." 4 pages.

.
Meta-Comments on the Very Idea of a Critical Theoiy: Raymond Guess
and The Idea of a Critical Theory
By Kai Nielsen
University of Calgaiy

The Frankfurt School and Jurgen Habermas have developed critica1theory
but they have not been very successful in saying in general what cri ti ca 1theory
is, in what its criticalness consists and how it differs from other comprehensive
conceptions of social science and of philosophy. Raymond Geuss in his Tlzc Idea
of a Critical Theory leaps into the breach and carefully and probingly seeks tu
answer these related questions.1
Jurgen Ha bermas, for all his extensive departures from Marx, sees himself
as a Marxian.2 Marx, on Habermas's account, and on the account of not a few
others, should himself be viewed as a critical theorist. There are, specific
problems about Marx's account aside, not unsurprisingly, general problems
about the very status of his account that are importantly similar to the problems
that affect later more explicitly articulated critical theory. They are questions
about theverynatureoftheenterprise. On theveryfirstpageofhis book Geuss
puts the problem thus:
It is widely recognized that Marx was a revolutionary figure,
but the exact nature of the revolution he initiated has not, in
general, been correctly understood. Of course, Marx did
dramatically change many people's views about an important subject-matter, human society, but in some ways the
greatest significance of his work lies in its implications for
epistemology. Marx's theory of society, if properly construed, does clearly give us knowledge of society, but does
not easily fit into any of the accepted categories of 'knowledge'. It obviously isn't a formal science like logic or mathematics, or a practical skill. Its supporters generally deny
that it is a speculative world-view of the kind traditionally
provided by religion and philosophy, yet neither would it
seem to be correctly interpreted as a strictly empirical theory
like those in natural science. Finally, it isn't just a confused
melange of cognitive and non-cognitive elements, an em pirical economics fortuitously conjoined with a set of value
judgments and moral commitments. Rather Marxism is a
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radically new kind of theory; to give a proper philosophic
account of its salient features requires drastic revisions in
traditional views about the nature of knowledge.(1)
Not all Marxists, Marxians (including most particularly analytical Marxists) or students of Marx would be happy with this characteri~ation . They
would particularly demur at the claim that "in some ways the greatest
significance of his work lies in its implications for epistemology."(1) They
would rather stick with Engels's general summing up of the import of Marx's
work where the claim is (a) that Marx was first and foremost a revolutionary
activist and (b) that he made a Copernican turn in the social sciences, giving us
a science that told us about the fundamental social structure of society,
explained how and why from one epoch to another societies would change nnd
(c) how this very social science would be a 'revolutionary social science'
serving as a crucial tool, though not only that, in the making and sustaining of
revolutions.3 But this, analytical Marxists would stress, requires no new
epistemology or epistemological reorientation, but just a good standard but
rather comprehensive social science. The knowledge that Marx gives us is of
a straightforwardly empirical kind, but, given our interests (if we are not
members of the haute bourgeoisie) and our reflective moral beliefs, we will put
that empirical knowledge to revolutionary or to at least emancipatory uses.
Analytical Marxists will respond to critical theorists that this requires no
special conception of knowledge or an altered epistemological stance or (for
that matter) any epistemological stance atall or a realignment of the categories
of knowledge. Nothing so conceptually surprising should enter in. We should
not, analytical Marxists claim, think of Marxism as a new kind of theory or even
a new kind of method but as a developing comprehensive empirical social
theory working within theparametersoftheestablishedsocial sciences.4 What
makes it different-the content of its particular claims aside-is that it is a theory
which its practitioners can put to work in the service of the interests of the
working class and finally, through the service of those interests, to humanity
generally. (That it can do this is not, of course, independent of what the context
is.) But it neither requires nor suggests a conceptual revolution which would
shake up our traditional views about the nature of knowledge. Marx, as he
made clear enough in The German Ideology~ settled his accounts with philosophy
and moved to a philosophically unencumbered concern with revolutionnry
activity and the constructing of a comprehensive social science which would
give us a true account of what the social world is like and would be useful in
the class struggle for human emancipation. Geuss and the critical theorists
who developed their distinctive brand of neo-Marxism think otherwise. Whntever Marx's beliefs about the nature of his own work, the work itself is not so
straightforwardly empirical. Whether or not, they argue, we should speak of
'Marx's method' or of a 'distinctive Marxian method' we should recognize that
critical theory is ~mportantly different in kind from a strictly empirical theory
such as Max Weber's or Talcott Parson's or Paul Samuelson's.
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Realizing that quite a few different things are going on in Das Kapital, for
example, thanina systematicvalue-freesocialscience, both analytical Marxists
and critical theorists need to face the challenge of Karl Popper that Marx's
theory and Marxist theories more generally . are "a confused melange of
cognitive and non-cognitive elements, an empirical economics fortuitously
conjoined with a setof valuejudgrnents and moral commitrnents."5 Analytical
Marxists respond to this charge by rationally reconstructing Marx and Marxian
theory in such a way that the moral commitments are purged from the
empirical social theory, and they are separately argued for as part of an
independent moral account competing with the work of Rawls, Nozick,
Gauthier, Walzer and Dworkin. G.A. Cohen, Jon Elster, John Roemer, Jeffrey
Reiman all brilliantly exemplify this work.6 However, it is-whether rightly or
wrongly-philosophically and conceptually conservative, giving us what in
Frankfurt School terms and in Geuss's terms is a 'positivist Marx'.
Critical theory by contrast seeks to construct a theory which as a comprehensive social science (where 'science' is construed non-scientistically) integrates into a single theory the descriptive-explanatory-interpretive side of
things and the normative-evaluative-emancipatory side of things. The positivist challenge is that this will, if w e try to place it in an integrated single theory,
remain a confused :r:nelange. Geuss seeks to elucidate, and where necessary
rationally to reconstruct, critical theory so as to rebut that positivist challenge
and to articulate in a perspicuous and plausible manner a critical theory of
society.
The account of a critical theory that Geuss elucidates, critically inspects
and seeks to defend in an appropriately rationally reconstructed form is not
that of Marx but basically a Frankfurt School nee-Marxism as adumbrated
most fully by Jurgen Habermas. He takes it, though he doesn't argue for this,
to be an account faithful to the general thru st of Marx's work. I think this a
plausible and interesting strategy and shall not challenge it here. (But we
should not forget the analytical Marxist challenge.) My interest will be instead,
whatever its Marxian pedigree, to see how good his case is for a distinctive
critical theory with a powerful emancipatory capacity. My reason fo r sticking
close to Geuss is that it seems to me he has raised the issue -the meta-issue if you
will- of what is the very idea of a critical theory-the second-order question
about its nature-more probingly than anyone else. He has understood the fo rce
of Habermas's theory very well and has a sense of the key questions to ask
about it. What is at stake is whether we have anything like a viable conception
of critical theory that marks it as an important and distinctive type of theory.
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II

Geuss remarks in his "Introduction" that the Frankfurt account of criticnl
theory yields three putatively distinguishing features which are the essentinl
distinguishing features of critical theory:
1. Critical theories have special standing as guides for human action
in that:
(a) they are aimed at producing enlightenment in the agents who
hold them, i.e. at enabling those agents to determine what their
true interests are;
(b) they are inherently emancipatory, i.e. they free agents from11
kind of coercion which is at least partly self-imposed, from the
self-frustration of conscious human action.
2. Critical theories have cognitive content, i.e. they are form s of
knowledge.
3. Critical theories differ epistemologically in essential ways fro m
theories in the natural sciences. Theories in natural science are
'objectifying'; critical theories are 'reflective' .(1-2)
There are, of course, a host of questions here. Most prominently there are
questions about what kind of criteria we have for what is emancipatory and
what is not, whether there are such things as 'true interests' or 'objective
interests', and what does this talk about 'objectifying theories' and 'reflective
theories' come to, if anything? Geuss, as we shall see, carefully examines these
questions. However, before going into that, he contrasts critical theory with
what critical theorists, using the term in a rather broad sense, call 'positivism'.
(Popper and Quine on that account, as different as they are from each other and
as different as they are from logical positivists, are paradigmatic positivists.) A
positivist is someone who holds (1) that an empiricist account of natural science
is adequate and (2) "thatallcognitionmusthaveessentiallythesamecognitive
structure as natural sciences". Positivism also (3) denies the very possibility of
'reflective knowledge' or 'reflective understanding' because all knowledge has
the same structure as natural science knowledge and all natural science
knowledge is objectifying knowledge. We should also note that (2) and (3) are
also the core of what Habermas calls scientism. Both scientism and positivism
involve the denial of reflective understanding, or at least any theoretical
reflective understanding, because they deny that "theories could be both
reflective and cognitive." (2) The critical question for critical theory is, is there
really any knowledge or understanding of this sort and, even given some
fragmentary understanding here, could it ever be a knowledge or an under·
standing that was embedded in a theory? A central goal of critical theory is the
critique of positivism and the rehabilitation of 'reflection' as a category of valid
knowledge. A central question to be asked, in turn, is whether it achieves thnt
disClosure: The Buying and Selling of Culture

goal or even makes it sufficiently clear so that we would have some appropriate
understanding of what achievement comes to here.
Geuss, before he turns to the details of exaP'lining critical theory, has one
further general remark to make. He claims that the "very heart of the critical
theory of society is its criticism of ideology."(2-3) What keeps people from
correctly perceiving their true situation and real interests is ideology. If they
are to "free themselves from social repression" they "must rid themselves of
ideological illusion."(3) Geuss asks "Can 'Ideologiekritik' form the basis of a
critical theory as defined by the three theses?"(3) So the central effort is to
"explain what a critical theory is supposed to be" and to ask whether such a
theory is possible, where I take it that question is to ask whether it is a feasiMe
possibility.
·

III
Geuss starts his detailed examination by asking about ideology and the
critique of ideology. Geuss begins by noting that 'ideology' has been used in
a number of different ways by various theorists for different purposes. And
among its uses are a number of neutral descriptive uses. For his distinct
purposes, purposes rather different than that of a social anthropologist, Geuss
narrows his conceptualization of ideology "to refer only to the beliefs of the
agents in thesociety."(7) This also squares withHabermas's usage. But plainly
not all such beliefs are ideological. Which subset among all the beliefs a people
have are their ideological beliefs? Geuss goes at that rather indirectly. "It will,"
he remarks, in general ''be an important fact about a given society how the
various kinds of acts and institutions are individuated ...."(~)) And in this
individuation, it will be important to ascertain "what kinds of beliefs, beliefs
of what kind of manifest content, will be able to function as ideologies for what
domains of action."(9) Again, Geuss notes, since 'ideology' is rather a term of
art here, the individuation, depending on who is doing it, goes in a number of
different and possibly confusing ways. His task is to try to define, stipulating
as he goes along for his purposes of specifying what is the sense of ideology
used in critical theory's conception of 'ideology critique', a subset of beliefs
which are ideological. He limits the subset to those beliefs which would
together constitute the world-view or world-picture of the group in question.(9) (Isn't that more likely to be a necessary condition than a sufficient
condition for an ideology?) Geuss remarks:
The intuition which motivates the introduction of a concept
of 'ideology as world-view' is that individuals and groups
don't just 'have' randomly collected bundles of beliefs,
attitudes, life-goals, forms of artistic activity, etc.The bundles
generally have some coherency -although it is very hard to
disClosure: The Buying and Sdlinx of Culture
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say m genera m w at t s co erency consists- e e emen ts
in the bundle are complexly related to each other, they all
somehow 'fit', and the whole bundle has a characteristic
structure which is often discernible even to an outside
observer. By an 'ideology' in the ~ense of "world-view'"
then is meant a subset of the beliefs which constitute the
ideology of the group (in a purely descriptive sense) which
has the following properties:
(a) the elements in the subset are widely shared among the
agents in the group
(b) the elements in this subset are systematically interconnected
(c) they are 'central to the agents' conceptual scheme' in
Quine's sense, i.e. the agents won't easily give them up
(d) the elements in the subset have a wide and deep influence on the agents' behavior or on some particularly
important or central sphere of action
(e) the beliefs in the subset are 'central' in that they deal with
central issues of human life (i.e. they give interpretations
of such things as death, the need to work, sexuality, etc.)
or central metaphysical issues. (10)
This is one way of identifying from the beliefs of a society the subset of beliefs
to be called ideological. (We need critically to ask if it is a very useful way.)
There is another way of conceiving of ideology that Geuss discusses. It is
a way developed by Daniel Bell and other proponents of the end-of-ideologythesis. Geuss calls the conception of ideology utilized here "ideology in the
programmatic sense."(11) An ideology in this sense is a way of translating
ideas into action."(11) And there is something in addition which for Bell's
theoretical purposes is very important, namely a conception of' a total ideology'
where this is construed as an all inclusive system of comprehensive reality: "a
set of beliefs, infused with passion" which "seeks to transform the whole W'llY
of life." (11) Put more pedantically a total ideology is:
(a) a program or plan of action
(b) based on an explicit, systematic model or theory of how the
society works
.
(c) aimed at radical transformation or reconstruction of the
society as a whole
(d) held with more confidence ('passion') than the evidence for
the theory or model warrants. (11)

~ith the ?ddition of (c) and (d) we get a polemical and tendentious us~ of
1d~lo?f. The acceptance of (d) makes the having of an ideology something
which is at least mildly irrational and (c) gives the characterization a politic'lll
disClosure: The Buying and Selling of Culture
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use since now we can say liberals and conservatives, unlike radicals, have no
ideology since their plans of action are not aimed at a "radical transformation
or reconstruction of the society as a whole."(11) But we could use just (a) and
(b) in our co~cep~alization of ~dec:'logy in a p~grammatic sense and perhaps
getaconceptionofideologywh1ch1snotparti-pris and is a useful social scientific
tool.
Next Geuss turns to a very subtle and nuanced analysis of the pejorative or
critical use of 'ideology' and the social analyses and critiques they can properly
fit. ~to. Her~ '_Ve get something that is more directly relevant to the ideologycntique of cntical theory. I cannot here reproduce the nuanced, complicated
typology of Geuss's account but I will attempt to give the core of it. (12-22)
"Whatisatissuehereis the critical use of the term 'ideology'. But that means that
to show that something is an ideology would be to show that we ought
somehow to try to eliminate it." (16) The background assumption is, where this
sense of 'ideology' is being talked about, ttiat the agents who have the ideological beliefs "are deluded about themselves, their position, their society and their
interests" and that being so deluded harms them and keeps them from living
as flourishing a life as they could have if they did not have those ideological
beliefs. A critical theory seeks (a) to show why they are so deluded and (b) to
free them from this delusion. Concerning this Geuss remarks significantly that
in "the most interesting cases the ideological delusion to be rooted out ... is not
an empirical error even of a very sophisticated kind but something quite
different." (12)
Here we have the famous or (if you will infamous) conception of ideology
as false consciousness. What is meant here is not, to understate it, crystal clear.
Geuss, in trying to specify a coherent use for 'false consciousness', asks "In what
sense or in virtue of what properties can a form of consciousness be ideologically false?"(l3) Reconsiders three kinds of answers to this question . All of
them are ways of answering the questions what makes a form of consciousness
an ideology, what makes a form of consciousness false.
A. "A form of consciousness is ideologically false in virtue of
some epistemic properties of the beliefs which are its constituents."(13)
B. "A form of consciousness is ideologically false in virtue of its
functional properties."(13)
C. "A form of consciousness is ideologically false in virtue of
some of its genetic properties."(13)
Consider (A) first. There are a number of ways in which the epistemic
properties of a belief can render it ideological. The belief may not be supported
by the available evidence, beliefs of different types may be confused, i.e. we
may confuse factual beliefs with normative ones. Here a "form of consciousness
is an ideology if it is essentially dependent on the epistemic status of some of its
disCwsure: The Buying and Sdlinx of Cutrure
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apparently constituent beliefs."(13) Geuss calls our atte~tio~ to a diverse lot of
significant ways beliefs can misfire here. (13-14) I will give only one very
simple case but one which is politically very central. "A form of consciousness
is ideologically false if it contains a false beli~f to the effect that the particular
interest of some subgroup is the general interest of the group as aw hole." I shall
turn to a discussion of this later. We will, that is, then look at this particular
alleged episte!l'ological misfiring.
His second general answer, namely (B), to what makes a form of consciousness an ideology is in virtue of some of its functional properties. This
functionalist approach to ideology has three versions. I shall, however, only
discuss one. It maintains that" a form of ~onsciousness is an ideology in virtue
of the function or role it plays in supporting, stabilizing, or legitimizing certain
kinds of social institutions or practices." (15) This fits well with Habermas's
speaking of "an ideology as a 'world picture' which stabilizes or legitimizes
domination or hegemony." But, of course, not all hegemony is bad. The
hegemony that is objectionable is one that produces more repression than
necessary for the society. There is for the society more repression than
necessary where people's needs are not being met as optimally as the level of
material development of society allows while still not undermining society's
capacity to maintain and reproduce itself, albeit without its unnecessary
repressive character. Where this hegemony justifies or supports reprehensible
social institutions, unjust social practices or relations of exploitation, a form of
consciousness which just accepts such a state of affairs, without in one way or
another reacting against it, is an ideological form of consciousness. To accept
such domination as legitimate is to be held captive by an ideological form of
consciousness. In speaking of the ideological belief resting on false consciousness, the claim is that if the people with the false conscious came to understand
how the functional properties of their ideological belief actually worked they
would give up the belief and thus they would no longer suffer from false
consciousness or be held captive by an ideology. Their ideological belief rests
on a rationalization for if the agents in question became aware that these beliefs
had those functional properties they would abandon them.

IV
We have isolated some of the senses of 'ideology' that are vital to critical
theory. What I have ignored isGeuss's important characterization of a positive
sense of 'ideology', something that would need attention in a fuller discussion
of his views and which is an important notion in its own right.(22-26) But it is
not so central to a discussion of the critique of ideology so I set it aside.
Traditional critical theory has formulated its conception of the critique of
ideology in three different ways.
disClosure: The Buying and Selling of Culture

1. Radical criticism of society and criticism of its dominant
ideology (ldeologiekritik) are inseparable; the ultimate goal
of all social research should be the elaboration of a critical
theory of society of which ldeologiekritik would be an
integral part.
2. ldeologiekritik is not just a form of 'moralizing critic ism', i.e.
an ideological form of consciousness is not criticised for
being nasty, immoral, unpleasant, etc. butforbeingfalse, for
being a form of delusion. ldeologiekritik is itself a cognitive
enterprise, a form of knowledge.
3. ldeologiekritik (and hence also the social theory of which it
· is a part) differs significantly in cognitive structure from
natural science, and requires for its proper analysis basic
changes in the epistemological views we have inherited
from traditional empiricism (modelled as it is on the study
of natural science). (26)
Of this conception or cluster of conceptions, Geuss asks two fundamental
questions: (1) "In what sense is the particular kind of Ideologiekritik under
discussion cognitive?" and (2) "In what sense would a proper account of the
kind of ldeologiekritik under discussion require revisions in our inherited
epistemology?" (26)

Geuss first considers critique of ideology as a form of "criticism along the
epistemic dimension"(26) . He asks whether(~ what the Frankfurt.school
believes) this form of criticism cannot, after all, be accommodated within a
traditional empiricist framework, accommodated within what the Frankfurt
school calls positivism. Critical theory characterizes positivism thus: positivism identifies those statements which, analytic propositions apart, are at least
potentially true or false. Those are statements which are scientifically testable
and those in turn are statements with observational content. They also seek to
identify statements which have cognitive content, by which is meant statements which make genuine knowledge claims. They also seek to identify
statements which can be rationally assessed, i.e, which are warrantably
acceptable or regrettable. (It may well be that to make genuine knowledgeclaims they must be warrantably assertible.) Statements without cognitive
content are cognitively meaningless. There is no sense in which they can be
rationallyassessedorwarrantablyasserted. Onlythosestatementswhichhave
observational content -paradigmatically cognitive statements- are s~ie~ti~i
cally testable. This is what the Frankfurt school characterizes as a sc1enhshc
view in which rationality is simply and solely scientific rationality and <.~nly
statements with observational content could possibly be knowledge claims
which could be subject to rational discussion and criticism?
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Geuss asks whether such a scientistic positivism (a pleonasm) could
accommodate ldeologiekritik. Faced with an ideological form of consciousness it could make two forms of criticism. It could in straightforward
empiricist fashion reject those ideological beliefs which are empirically folseor
not well supported.(27) It could also in that same vein of argument clearly
distinguish cognitive from non-cognitive beliefs and reject all second-order
beliefs which attribute to noncognitive beliefs cognitive standing. (That is a
familiar positivist critique of religious belief or, if you will, religious ideology.)8 The various objectifying beliefs which are a prominent form of ideology
are subject, from within their empiricist epistemological parameters, to
positivistically oriented ideology critique. Similarly a positivist oriented critique of ideology can handle the critique of self-fulfilling beliefs where the
evidence is tainted. But what it cannot accommodate, Geuss claims, are those
familiar ideological beliefs which rest on the "confusion of a particular for a
general interest."(27) Those ideological beliefs, Geuss maintains, are "quite
beyond the scope of positivist criticism."(27) This claim baffles me. The
ideological belief in question "contains a false belief to the effect that the
particular interest of some subgroup is the general interest of the group as a
whole."(14) Butthatseems tome plainly a factual, empirical beliefwhosetrnth
or falsity is determined in a standard empirical way. It is in the interest of the
capitalist class that there be little labor strife (strikes and the like). Suppose it
is also asserted that it is in the interest of workers as well that this particular
interest be satisfied, i.e. thatthere belittle labor strife. What is to be said on such
matters may not always be obvious, but this is typically true of complex
empirical matters. But at least in principle what is the case can be determined
in the same way it is determined whether people should have lots of fiore in
their diet or have automobile insurance. There is nothing here which is not in
the purview of positivist critique.
This seems to be so obvious that I wonder whether Geuss did not have
something else in mind. What the Frankfurt school believes is that "the
positivist'snotion of 'rationality' is too narrow and restricted, and can'thandle
any of the more interesting cases of ideological delusion; by excluding normative ... beliefs ... from rational discussion and evaluation, the positivist leaves
without guidance ... important parts of our form of consciousness, and thereby
abandons whole areas of our life to mere contingent taste, arbitrary decision,
and sheer ii:rationality."(28) Perhaps what Geuss had in mind about the
particular interest and general interest was to consider why we should cctcris
paribus give the latter more weight in moral deliberation. Still, Geuss in a
related matter asks a very positivistically oriented question of the critical
theorist. Suppose, a sis not implausible, that instrumental rationality is the only
clear conception of rationality. How, particularly if that is so, he asks, "do we
know that taste, preference, and decision aren't the best we can do as guides to
what attitudes, normative beliefs, etc. we should adopt. How do we know it
isn't just wishful thinking to think that we have some kind of normative
knowledge, or attain some rational set of preferences and attitudes."(28)
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Suppose, to flesh the above considerations out with some examples, I
prefer jogging to walking because I believe jogging is better for my health . If I
learn that it is false (empirically false) that jogging is better for my health at my
age I will then drop that preference if I really p~efer jogging tow alking because
I believe it is better for my health. However, not all preferences behave that
way. I might, for an evening's drink, though not at dinner, prefer white wine
to red wine believing mistakenly that white wine is better for me. However,
evenafterldiscovermyempiricalmistake,Imightstillcontinuetopreferwhite
wine to red in those situations simply because in those contexts I enjoy it more.
For so keeping my preferences in their old mold, even after I recognize my
cognitive mistake, I need not be any the less rational for all of that. What is
important to see here, in thinking about how ideology works, is that "if the only
reason [unlike the white wine case] we hold the belief is that we (falsely) think
that it is a cognitive belief, then, when we are enlightened about its epistemic
standing, we will give it up."(29) Suppose A has a tendency to homosexuality
-it would be his unschooled sexual preference- but is actually heterosexual and
prefers heterosexuality because he believes homosexuality is unnatural. Ht>
takes that latter belief to be cognitive beliefbutwhen he discovers it is not-that
we have no intelligible criteria for what is unnatural and what is not- he will
give it up and very likely come to prefer homosexuality. When he discovers his
prior belief about what is unnatural lacks cognitive standing, he will, in all
likelihood, drop the schooled preference ordering that is dependent on it.
Indeed, if hedoesn' t, he thereby shows that the preference ordering is really not
dependentonit. This is not like the case of a person'spreference forwhitewine .
When a preference or value judgment is presented as a cognitive belief, this,
where the ideological deception works, tends, where it is believed to be a true
cognitive belief, to compel acceptance in a way that people will not feel
compelled. (rationally constrained) to accept other preferences. But when it is
clearly seen not to be a cognitive belief its hold is dissipated.
This, or so it seems at least, shows something effective about positivist
ideology-critique. ''Positivists can count on people giving up beliefs whid1
have been shown not to be cognitive, but to be expressions of preference which
cannot be acknowledged publicly as grounds for acting."(27) But, that notwithstanding, Geuss claims in defense of critical theory that positivists cannot
give an account of why it is that they make the right judgment here. Geuss
remarks the "motivation of the program must be to free agents from irrational
belief and action by causing them to give up beliefs based on preferences those
agents could not acknowledge: but the positivists can't admit that the motivation of the program is rational (since there aren't any 'rational motivations') or
that the effect is to make the agents more rational. So positivists can't justify
their own activity of criticising ideologies except as a personal preference or
arbitrary decision." (29-30)
Geuss in turn gives the positivist a powerful reply. We should ask
ourselves, reflecting as well on the argument of the previous two paragraphs,
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whether it does not after all give us all that we need by way of n critical
conception without going on a complicated detour through the specinl epistemological claims of critical theory? I shall quote Geuss's reply on behnlf of the
positivist in full.
·
To this the positivist may reply that the fact that people
do change their beliefs as described in the last paragraph is
no grounds for saying that they have thereby become more
rational, acquired a more 'justified' or 'truer' or more 'warranted' set of beliefs. What they have done is to bring their
beliefs, preferences, and value judgments into closer agreement with the rest of their non-cognitive beliefs, e.g. beliefs
aboutwhich preferences they' ought' to allow themselves to
express or by which they 'ought' to allow themselves to·be
moved. From the fact that the resulting set of beliefs,
preferences, etc. is more coherent and consistent, it doesn' t
follow that it is 'knowledge', or 'true'. Furthermore, it is
sheer defamation to claim that positivists need consider
their own activity a mere 'arbitrary' decision; to say that an
activity is not grounded on some 'substantial concept of
human rationality' (whatever that might mean) is not to say
that it is based on some arbitrary decision. It isn't' arbitrary'
if it is motivated by deep seated human needs, an expression
of concern for human suffering, etc. But that doesn't make
this decision one 'motivated by reason itself' -it is motivated
by perfectly understandable and. unexceptionable human
desires. The decision.to eat when one is very hungry is n ot
arbitrary- I couldn't equally well have decided to go swimming- but that doesn't make eating a form of knowledge.
(30)

While acknowledging the force of the above, still, given their theoretical
assumptions, there is only a rather constrained sense -or so Geuss nrgues- in
which positivists can argue about norms. Geuss wonders if it is sufficient to
provide an adequate ideology-critique. Attitudes, preferences, value judgements and normative beliefs can have no direct observational content and they
cannot, or so positivists claim, have any cognitive content or be tn1e or folse.
This being so there is, as Geuss puts it, "strong limits to rational discussion of
them, and ultimately one can have no warrant for adopting or acting on them;
·any consistent set of preferences, attitudes, etc. is as good, as 'rational' ns nny
other." (31) This, Geuss believes, shows that .t he positivist conception of
rationality is impoverished and rests on a mistake. Habermas, Geuss remnrks,
is perfectly justified in making the obvious counter that "clearly not nny
consistent set of preferences, attitudes, and normative beliefs is as 'rntionnl' as
any other. This sense of 'rational' may be unclear and difficult to annlyze but .
that doesn't mean that it is illicit or doesn't exist, and if positivism cnn' t givenn
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account of it, so much the worse for positivism ."9 Still, recognizing this we
need not-and indeed should not-go on in a fine rationalist fiddle; we need not,
and indeed should not, that is, go on to claim " that there is a single, 'true',
uniquely rational set of preferences, attitudes and normative beliefs."(31) In
rejecting the positivist attitude because it is too circumscribed, we need not
claim that there is a distinct something that could be called 'normative
knowledge', or claim that it even makes sense to say that some preferences are
true and others false or even that some norms are true and others false. But
while a factual or mathematical proposition is true or false, it does not mnke
sense to speak of such propositions as being more or less true or (more
generally) to speak of truth as admitting of degrees. But, as Geuss observes,
"rationality is not like that."(31) It admits of degrees. "Decisions, preferences,
attitudes, etc. can be more or less rational; agents can hnve stronger or weaker
warrant for their actions, can be more or less aware of their own motives, can
be more or less enlightened in their n ormative beliefs." (31) Moreover, suppose
we have two sets of moral beliefs and attitudes A and Band the persons holding
A and the persons holding B both seek to have these beliefs form n consistent
set. More than that, they both seek to get these beliefs nnd attitudes into
agreement with their other beliefs and with what is understood about the
world, including what we know about human nature and the social world.
Doing these things will be seen by reflective agents as a reasonable thing to do.
A and B both act reasonably in doing this. Now, if A is more successful in
this than B, then A has a more reasonable account of the world and of how to
act than B. The greater the coherency here the more rational the account is, i.e.
the more plausible the whole set of beliefs (normative and non-normntive),
attitudes, preferences, theories and the like. They are not, in thnt evenh.rnlity,
just a jumble. Instead, they fit together into a coherent whole: indeed some
clusters of belief more so than others. What A and B achieve, if they nre
reasonably successful in their activity (B more so than A), is a coherent cluster
of beliefs, attitudes, etc. It is always a matter of more or less here. Some
accounts have fewer loose ends than others: are more coherent thnn others llnd
those accounts are th e accounts that it is the more reasonable to hold. But we
hardly have any conception of 'perfect coherency' here; that, like 'perfect
clarity', is something we have little understanding of (Wittgenstein wns very
much on the mark here.) Yet some accounts have more warrant than others, fit
things together more adequately than others. We are not in a place where we
should speak of arbitrariness or should say that decision is king.

v
Geuss turns now to an examination of functionalist accounts of ideology,
that is, to the functional properties of fo rms of consciousness. Here an
"ideology is a world-picture which stabilizes or legitimizes dominntion."(31)
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Geuss asks of such an account "what is the relation between the 'falsity' of the
form of consciousness and its functioning to support or legitimize oppression?"(32) He then, in an acute but inconclusive discussion, examines four
possibilities.(32-26) I shall only discuss on~. It is, however, one of crucial
importance. It is this: "the world-picture is false -we assume from the start that
we have whatever grounds are necessary for asserting that- and the judgment
that the world-picture functions oppressively is parasitic on our judgment that
it is false."(32) A crucial case is this. We have a world-picture that is false,
whereby what is meant is that no rationally warranted world-picture could
yield a sound argument for the de jure legitimacy of the set of institutions and
practices of that society. Some of the normative beliefs, some key factual beliefs
and, as well, the merely factual sounding beliefs embedded in these institutions
and practices are unwarranted and there are no rational reconstructions of
them (or at least none are plausibly in sight) which would render them
warrantable Oustifiable, rationally acceptable to people with clear heads and
accurate factual information). No world-picture, acceptable and accessible to
agents, where they are accurately informed and reasoning correctly (ma k in~
no invalid inferences), could yield sound arguments for the de jurc legitimacy
of their social institutions. Yet, though the institutions continue to function
oppressively (they cause unnecessary suffering, deprivation of needs and
impede human flourishing), the agents continue to accept them and believe in
their legitimacy. People who stand free of the ideology in question, know or
reasonably believe the institutions to be oppressive (repress beyond what
could be rationally justified). They know or reasonably believe, that is, that
there are no justified or justifiable norms or warrantably assertible norms
which would justify those repressive institutions. Here the judgment that the
world-picture functions oppressively is parasitic on the judgment that the
world-picture is false. In saymg it is false, what is meant is that it is constituted
by a set of factual beliefs and factual sounding beliefs where some of the crucial
ones are false or incoherent and where that world-picture as well has a set of
normative beliefs which cannot be warrantably asserted. There is in that
society the deprivation of human wants and needs, and there is human
suffering and lack of self-fulfillment. Moreover, these maladies cannot be
shown to be unfortunate necessities to be born with, for the norms used to
justify the institutions requiring these ills could not have a rational warrant,
given the development of the productive forces and their potential for fu rther
development in our time and some quite unproblematic facts about human
nature (e.g. that people have certain identifiable needs and in most circumstances do not want them frustrated). The functional picture is that we have an
ideology which is a world-picture which stabilizes or legitimizes domination.
That is its principal function on such a conception. In the situation described
here -a typical situation- our judgment that it so functions depends on our
judgment that the world-picture is false in the way specified above. The
soundness of such an argument, as Geuss stresses in another context, depends
crucially on our being able to give an objective (rationally warranted
intersubjective) account of what our wants, desires and needs are and, in
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relation to them, what the requirements of the economy are.(35) He goes on to
remark,correctlyibelieve, thattheseconceptualizationsarenotunproblematic.
Geuss remarks that "associated with every, human society there will be a
set of 'accepted' wants, 'needs' and desires and a traditional level of expected
satisfactions of these wants and desires."(35) But here ideological considerations return like the repressed, for, Geuss goes on to remark, "the set of
'accepted' wants, needs and desires, and the traditional level of consumption
may themselves be part of the 'ideology' we wish to criticize."(36) What we
seem at least to need, but it appears at least that we do not have, and perhaps
cannot have, is "a standpoint outside the given social interpretation of the
agents' needs, from which to criticize the ideological picture of needs and wan ts
and their proper scheduling. Any appeal that would claim our only real needs
are those which must be satisfied to ensure minimal biological survival would,
though it might break out of the ideological circle, not be adequate for a critical
normative perspective. Even very oppressive social orders do not threaten
biological survival generally. Some individuals might go under -predictably
would go under- but most would not and the species would survive. To
intellectually combat such a society we need (a) a justified conception of social
justice, (b) a rationally warranted picture of what our genuine wan ts and needs
are along with an account of which are the more basic, (c) a scheduling of thei r
relative importance when they conflict, and finally (d) an accurate picture of the
level of material development in the world: a good understanding of the
capacity of the productive forces to continue to develop and some reasonable
understanding of the mechanisms for their development. Is it plausible to
believe that we can get an adequate account of these things? It indeed asks for
a lot but what it asks for does not seem at least to be a conceptual impossibility .

VI
An ideology is (at least) a form of consciousness which answers to certain
class interests, most typically the interests of the dominant class in the society,
where the ideology has intellectual and moral hegemony. Where we speak of
an ideology as a world-picture we can speak of the world picture as answering
to such class interests. A simple way, following this consideration out, of
stating what Ideologiekritik would characteristically come to is to say that those
who "suffer from ideologically false consciousness are deluded about their own
true interests."( 45) A central-perhaps the principal- task of Idcolngickri tik is to
enlighten people so deluded, or prone to such delusion or at risk of coming to
be so deluded, about their true interests.(45) The thing is to help people to come
to see what their true interests are. Understanding class interests and understanding how deeply antagonistic they are is of ~ital importance here.

As attractive as it is, this, as is widely recognized, gives rise to a whole
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hornet's nest of problems: what is a human interest? How, if at all, does it differ
from what people want or desire? And what are their true, genuine, objective
or real interests? Is it just that a bunch of persuasive definitions are being
surreptitiously introduced or do these adjec~ves actually qualify interests and
if so how? These are just some of the problems, though they are the key ones,
that well up concerning interests. Geuss identifies the key problems thus: what
mightit "mean to distinguish the 'true' or 'real' or 'objective' interests of agents
from their 'merely apparent' or 'merely phenomenal' or 'perceived' interests,
and what might be meant by the claim that a group of agents is deceived or
deluded about its true interests?"(45)
Geuss, though I think he may overdo this point, wants to treat both
'desires' and 'needs' as theoretical constructs. I think pace Geuss that we
discover them and then, to overcome certain ambiguities in our concephlaliza tion
of them, we make some stipulations on our use of the terms. But perhaps there
is little more than a verbal difference between us here and in any event it is not
central. It is crucial, however, to distinguish between desires, interests and
needs. Geuss writes:
Up to now I have spoken of wants, interests, needs,
desires, and preferences of a group of agents as if they were
all more or less the same thing. We attribute a set of wants,
preferences, and desires to a group of agents on the basis of
their explicit avowals-that is, on the basis of what they sny
theywant-andon thebasisoftheirachlalovertbehavior. But
the avowals may be confused, fragmentary, and contradictory, and may stand in a most tenuous relation to a body of
equally confused and conflict-ridden behavior. We neither
wish to take what they say strictly at face-value despite
overwhelming evidence that they never act on their avowed
'desires,' nor will we want to ignore completely the fact of
human weakness and assume that their sincere assertions
are hypocritical, if they don't always act on them. So the set
of desires and preferences we attribute to the group is a
theoretical construct which fills out the fragmentary evidence, removes some of the contradictions between avow a ls
and behavior, wants and desires of which no individual
member is aware. It will be quite difficult in making this
theoretical construct not to impose on the group too determ ina te and coherent a set of desires; when should apparent
contradictions be allowed to stand and what kind of rationality assumptions should be made when smoothing them out?
Individuals and groups, then, may be unaware of some of
their own desires and preferences, i.e. on the basis of their
manifest behavior we may have reason to attribute to them
preferences and desires which they not only themselves
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never articulate, but which they would verbally disavow .
(45-46)
Needs, by contrast, aredefinedandidentifi~d by reference to the successful
functioning of individuals, and (according to Geuss) to societies as well. People
can determine whether or not they need food, rest, sex, security, work, friendship, companionship, recognition, community, social identity or religion by
determining whether these things are necessary for their successful functioning. Sometimes it is fairly obvious as in the cases of rest and food, companionship and recognition; at other times it is less obvious. It is also the case that
'successful functioning' is a rather flexible and indeterminate conception and
that in some cases we cannot determine (at least at the present) with any
assurance what it would come to. It is even more difficult with respect to
society. What is it, Geuss asks rhetorically, for a society to be 'healthy' or
'pathological'? Surely these are not unproblematic notions. But it does not at all
follow from that that nothing can be made of them. However, even where we
are speaking of individuals, in some cases we cannot, or cannot clearly, determine what is necessary for successful functioning, in other cases we can
determine it quite unproblematically. If, for example, I want to ftmction at <111
successfully I better not try to get along on two hours of sleep per night for l1
fortnight. Because sometimes we do not know what to say we should not hl1ve
a fit of skepticism. Sometimes what we need to successfully function is quite
unproblematic.

In most cases we are aware of our own desires but in a not inconsidert1ble
numberofcaseswewillnotbeawareofourownneeds. Whatweclet1rheadedly
avow we want seems to settle it for when we avow it at least, but what we
clearheadedly avow that we need does not settle it. We may honestly a vow that
weneedsomethingwhenwedonotand similarlydenythatweneedsomething
when we really do. But, very unusual circumstances aside, ifl honestly st1 y I t1 m
tiredand want to go to bed thatsettlesitina way my claim that I need more sleep
than I have been getting lately does not. Someone might correctly assert thl1t I
sleep too much anyway and do not need any more sleep and their assertion
might very well be true, my avowals to the contrary notwithstanding.
The concept of interest is tricky. Geuss, rightly I believe, carefully distinguishes between desires and interests. People may not take an interest in
satisfying their own desires and wishes. And they may (though Geuss doesn't
note that) take no interest in what is in their own interest. Crucially, they may
desire things that are not in their own interests or not at all desire or wt1nt what
it is in their own interests to have. Evidence that the difference here is not just
that between first-order and second-order desires is brought out by the following example. "Unregenerate alcoholics assert that they haven strong desire for
drink and deny that they have any desire not to drink, and their beht1vior bears
them out. Still, the unregenerate alcoholic has an interest in not drinking (t1nd
in developing the appropriate second-order desire)."(47) He has this interest
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though he may take no interest in what is in his interest. This shows that, given
our common employment of concepts, desires and interests (and needs as well)
are importantly different. (This is reflected in French, Engli~h a.nd German in
our use of the relevant terms. But presumably these generalizations about use
to show what our concepts are would go over to other natural languages as well.
H they do not, we are surely in trouble.)
For the sake of discussion at least, one could accept, though not at all for
Churchlandian reasons, that interests is a suspect concept, a concept that we
should perhaps set aside as we do the concept of sin. For, as Geuss asks, going
back totheabovecaseof theunregeneratealcoholic: " ... whatdoes itmean to say
thatalcoholicshaveaninterest, butnodesiretorestricttheirdrinkingotherthan
we, the outside observers, think that it would be better for them not to have the
desire for drink?" (Emphasis mine, 47) I think it does mean more than th<lt. To
see this we should start by recognizing that the concept of interest is problematic and obscure, Geuss claims, "partly because it is suppose to connect or
'mediate reason' with the faculty of 'desire' ."(47) Interests arise out of desires.
If we were not creatures who had desires we would not be creatures that had
interests. Yourcarmayhaveneedsbutithasnointerests. Onlybeingswhohad
desires could have interests. But from this it does not follow that interests and
desires are the same thing.
Geuss, fastening in now on a specification of what he takes this elusive
concepfof interest to be, remarks: "To speak of an agent's 'interests' is to speak
of the way that agent's particular desires could be rationally integrated into a
coherent 'good life'."(47-8) We can specify clearly enough what that would
come to in some specific ·cases as Geuss does: "Alcoholics can be said to have an
'interest' in giving up drink, even if they don't recognize it because we know
that health (and, in extreme cases, life itself) is central to their conception of the
'good life' and that excessive drinking cannot be integrated into such a life."(48)
That is a useful and successful example, and we no doubt could extensively
provide other and similar examples. Still, I think it is not a very satisfactory way
of procee<;ling. It is not that we come to understand what is good from
understanding what our interests are, but we come to understand what our
inte!ests are from knowing what is good, or at least from understanding what
webelievetobegood. Oneoftheseemingadvantagesoftalkingaboutinterests
-think of its role in a theory like that of Ralph Barton Perry's or Paul Ziff' s- is that
we would have, if those theories are on the mark, in talking about interests, a
purely naturalistic and empirical concept that we could appeal to without
appealing to any prior moral or normative notions and which, in tum, we could
use in giving content to our conceptions of the good. But if we have to specify
what our interests are by way of a conception of a coherent good life we have
lost that naturalistic advantage and, moreover, and independently, we have
taken to specifying something which is not very clear in terms of something
which is still less clear, namely a conception of 'a coherent good life' where
'good life', to add insult to injury, is put in scare quotes by Geuss.
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VII
Be that as it may, we have a sufficient specification of desires, needs and
interests here to be able correctly to say that ~ple can rightly be said to be
mistaken about what they desire, need and what is in their interests. And this
leaves conceptual space for the very possibility of ldeologiekritik.
Geuss puts the point well:
Just as I may have wants and desires of which I am
unaware-wants and desires I evince in my behavior, but
which I do not recognize and avow-and needs of which I am
unaware, I can also have interests of which I am unaware.
From thefactthatlhavea certain need, it does not follow that
I have a desire to satisfy that need. HI am unaware of the
need I may not act in any way which could be construed as
trying to satisfy the need. However I do wish to say that I
have an 'interest' in the satisfaction of anything which can
reasonably be termed a 'need'.
There is no mystery, then, to the claim that agents are
deceived or mistaken about their wants and desires or their
interests. I may sincerely avow a desire which my behavior
belies, or vehemently repudiate a desire, which, as my behavior shows, I clearly have. If the agents are unaware of
some of their needs, they may have formed a set of interests
which is incompatible with the satisfaction of those needs, or
they may have formed a set of interests which is inconsistent
or self-defeating, or I may have perfectly good 'empirical'
grounds for thinking that the pursuit of their present set of
interests will lead them not, as they suppose, to happiness,
tranquillity, and contentment, but to pain, misery, and frustration. H agents are deceived or mistaken about their
interests, we will say that they are pursing 'merely apparent'
interests, and not their 'real' or 'true' interests. (48)
This via-negativa may be enough. Still theoreticians who have engaged in
ldeologiekritik have, not unreasonably, wanted so·m ething more robust. They
have wanted to speak in some reasonably determinate way of 'real', 'true' or
'objective' interests sans scare quotes. They have wanted to say what they are
and how we could come to know them. Geuss takes the problem here to be that
of defining 'true interests' and he considers two attempts to do so, tlzc 'pcrfcctknowledge approach' and the 'optimal conditions approach'.
The perfect-knowledge approach can most easily be illustrated if we tum
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holic. He has a strong first-order desire to drink, no second-order desire to stop
or even moderate his drinking and he does not see that it is in his interests to stop
drinking. But, as Geuss points out, we can still correctly say he does not know
his true interests. He takes no interest in and does not see tha t it is in his own
interest to stop drinking because he is ignorant and has false views about what
is in his own interests. He has never heard of cirrhosis and h e thinks that
drinking is good for his circulation. "In that case we say that he is mistnken
about his interests, and what we mean by that is that if he knew m ore thnn he
does -if, for instance, he had correct views about the effects of drinking on his
health- he would recognize that it is not in his interest to drink." (49) As we gain
the appropriate knowledge we will gain an even clea rer and m ore correct view
about what our interests actually are. Extrapolating from tha t we should say
that if we were tohaveperfect knowledge then w e would finally kn ow whntour
true interests are.
There are at least two problems with this a pproach but they m ay very well
not be insuperable. One is what is to count as perfect knowledge? "Presumnbly it
must include at least all empirical know ledge of the kind that can be provided
by the sciences, but does it include such things as the kind of self-knowledge
acquired in psychoanalysis or know ledge of w ha t could satisfy n person.
(Asked in quite a first person w ay.) Do I kn ow my real in terests if I h<lve
available 'perfect' empirical knowledge, but h ave n ot u sed it to reflect correctly
on my present wants and interests to m ake them consisten t?"(49) (And what
does 'reflect correctly' come to here? H ow do we test w hen we have done it
right? Recall the importance that tha t arch positivist Rudolp h Carnap attached
to testability.) How strong we should m ake the requirem ent for 'perfect
knowledge' here is not evident. Moreover, it is not indep endent nf whnt we
think we can know. If our approach is rather positivist a nd we are wary about
talk of 'self-knowledge', we will work with a more minimal conception of
perfect knowledge. If, altema tively, we think tha t such caution h ere reflects our
being hobbled by a scientistic metaphysics (metaphysics within the limits of
natural science alone), we will go for a richer conception of p erfect knowledge,
a conception that involves some appeal to self-knowledge. Whichever way we
go, we seem to do so because we embrace one of two stan ces about whnt it is
possible to know: the positivist one or the critical theory o ne.

If we take the latter route we need to be prepa red to give an accounting of
what reflective knowledge comes to. (I do not, however, want to su ggest for a
moment that we cannot. But only to say that w e need very carefully to do it.)
I thin.kit also needs to be noted that even if w e takethe positivistmini malistway
here to perfect knowledge (and thus rather limit ourselves) w e still cnn get a
good empirical look into w ha t our true interests are.
There is a second difficulty that may be no more than a puta tive d ifficulty.
If Matti, let us say, gains p erfect knowledge about his excessive drinking:
knowledge, that is, about alcohol's effect on his liver, his brain, his ability to
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control his life, keep his job a nd the like-that is, if he is clear about how much
it will harm him, and he reflectiv ely and in a cool hour takes all this to heart, and
still doesn't judge that it is n ot in his interests to drink then his continuing to
drink does not, on the perfect-knowledge app roach, after all, run athwart his
genuine interests. What is in Matti's interests (by d efinition on this account) is
what Matti takes to be in his interestw}:len he has perfect knowledge reflectively
entertained in a cool hour. But, if the result of such an entertainment by Mntti
is that of the above, it is not impossible to think that this is a rcductio of such a
definition of 'true interests'. Such a d efinition of 'interests' is just too subjective.
We moved from talk of desires to talk of interests, in the first place, to avoid such
subjectivism. Now we are back _in the stew again.
To this response in return it might be replied: people as a matter of fact just
do not so judge of their interests. It is only by dragging in irrelevant desertisland examples -things w h ich are little more than mere logical possibilitiesthat it can come to seem that what would be in Matti's true interests in such a
circumstance is at all problematic. It just is not in a person's interests, if their
circumstances are at all n ormal, to drink themselves to death. If the person in
question w ould judge otherwise even under conditions of perfect knowledge
that does not change matters. But that, if correct, certainly reveals a weakness
in the perfect-knowledge approach. We cannot determine in all cases what are in
our true interests by ascertaining what we would desire or what we would
choose under con ditions of perfect knowledge.
Geuss n ext considers the 'optimal conditions approach' to ascertain what our
true interests are. It starts, Geuss points out, "from the observation that the
desires a nd hence the intere.s ts of h u man agents have been extremely variable,
and that what desires and interests the agents will form will depend to a large
extent on the circumstances in w h ich they find themselves."(49) In horrifying
circumstances-circumstances of great deprivation and suffering-people, as the
lk, will behave in h orrendous ways. Where these behavior patterns get
stamped in, people will tend to act in these ways for a time even if it no longer
answers to their interests to d o so. To lookforpeople'sreal interests, the optimal
conditions approach argues, we need to ascertain what interests would be
formed under optim al (i.e. beneficent) conditions.(50) It is, as Geuss notes,
difficult to say what these optimal conditions for forming interests are. And he
does notsay, orevenhint a t, w h attheyare, thoughhedoessaywhattheyaren't,
namely "positive h indran ces to the formation of 'true' interests."(SO) Wh<lt
impedes the formation of true interests are extreme deprivation, circumstances
where p eople are m altreated or unduly coerced, pressured or influenced, or in
conditions of considerable ignorance or where they have many false beliefs.
Where those conditions or conditions like them do not obtain, we approach
optimal conditions. Interests form ed under those optimal conditions are our
true interests. Interests formed under con ditions approximating those optimal
conditions are app rbximations of ou r true interests.
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The question arises as to whether the true interests identified under the
perfect-knowledge approach and the optimal-conditions approach are the same.
Prima fade at least they are distinct for "the task of becoming fully aware of the
wants and interests one actually has is different from the task of acquiring the
'right' human interests -the ones one would have been able to acquire had one
lived in supremely fortunate circumstances." (50) Geuss argues that appearances here are deceiving and both approaches yield the same true interests and
do not conflict with each other, for in coming to have perfect knowledge we will
come to know what the optimal conditions for forming desires and interests are.
And in that way, given that we would want what we recognize to be most
beneficial (optimal) for ourselves, we would seek to put ourselves in that
. optimal position. Optimal conditions are conditions of, at the very least, nondeprivation, non-coercion and minimally correct information . People who
grow up, as we do, in conditions which are far from optimal, but still not so bad
as the conditions of some others, will in that situation have interests which are
somewhatdifferentfromthetrueintereststhey(we)wouldhaveunder optimal
conditions. Thatnotwithstanding, we (that is people so formed), where we see
they were so optimal, would still prefer to live under optimal conditions where
different interests would form : interests which are our true interests and which
we would recognize to be such in optimal circumstances.
Interests, we should also note, are not only related to effective desire but alsu
to judgment. As we saw in the alcoholic case, it is possible for an alcoholic to haw
no effective desire, second order or otherwise, to stop drinking and still judge
thatitisnotinhistrueinterests to drink so much and mean by that that if he had
been born and had grown up in more optimal circumstances the interests he
would have formed would include an interest in not drinking to excess. And,
if he had grown up in those circumstances, he would at the very least have
formed a second-order desire not to drink so excessively and he would, as well,
judge that it is not in his true interests to so drink. Moreover, th is is also a
judgment he would realize, if he were in such circumstances, he would have
made if he had perfect knowledge and that he would have perfect knowledge
in such circumstances. '1f the agents have the requisite 'perfect know ledge' the
interests they will acknowledge as their 'real interests' will be those they know
they would form under optimal conditions of non-deprivation and noncoercion."(53) (But we still have the counter-example trotted out above.)
Geuss thinks that this claim is at least roughly correct and that it is a claim
that Habermas and the Frankfurt school would accept, though for slightly
differentreasons. Buttheywouldalsostressthedoublebind thatweare inhere.
They would stress, as more orthodox Marxists do as well, that a society, all of
whose members live under conditions of great deprivation, is not going to gain
even anything like (even remotely approximating) perfect know ledge. We can
approach that only as the development of the productive forces advances very
far and there is a considerable amount of social wealth· widely distributed.
Moreover, the knowledge we need to gainofourwants,needs, motives, of what
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kind of life one would find acceptable and satisfying and the like is only
something we will attain, if we attain it at all, in a society where there is
"extensive room for free discussion and the unrestrained play of the imagination with alternative ways of living." (54) Ou: real or true interests are the
interests we would form or come to have in conditions of perfect knowledge
and freedom . Still there are problems here and Geuss shows us our bind here
and something of the way out of it.

,
1

This line of argument shows how 'real interests' in both senses might
converge, but only at the cost of creating a double bind: the interests the agents
would form given perfect knowledge coincide with those they would form in
optimal conditions, because the agents couldn't acquire 'perfect knowledge'
unless they were in 'optimal conditions'. But to be in 'optimal conditions' is not
only to bein conditions of freedom, but also not to lack any relevant knowledge.
We can't be fully free without having perfect knowledge, nor acquire perfect
knowledge unless we live in conditions of complete freedom . Our ' renl
interests' are those we would form in such conditions of perfect knowledge nnd
freedom. Although we can be in a position fully to recognize our ' real interests'
only if our society satisfies the utopian condition of perfect freedom, still,
although we do not live in that utopia, we may be free enough to recognize how
we might act to abolish some of the coercion from which we suffer and move
closer to 'optimal conditions' of freedom and knowledge. The task of a critical
theory is to show us which w ay to move. (54)
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Seemingly since Jacob Epstein's 1988 polemic, "Who Killed Poetry?"
there has been much sectarian ballyhoo over the purpose of poetry in the
contemporary, highly m~diated American techno-culture. The post-Bent
practitioners, trafficking in subversive subject matter, rail against the
formulaic lyric that creative writing workshops manufacture in what has
to be the worst example of supply-side economics since 11of1ody, so the
argument goes, reads poetry anyway. Those cloistered inside university
creative writing workshops blame the recondite experiments of the West
Coast scholl loosely labelled "the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets", for making verse incomp rehensible to that shadowy figure, the man in the street.
The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E apologists riposte that since the world is no
longer Word sworth's pastoral sanctuary of self, the mawkish solipsism of
formal lyric poety is little more than reactionary drivel.
There are so many schools of poetry and so many genealogies leading
to its modern matrix, that to pronounce poetry dead is to profess one's own
ignorance of this p rotean field - perhaps the only modem art form whose
emergence hasn 't been hamstrung by commercial distractions, as is particularly the case with film and painting. The question, then, "Who killed
poetry?" must be translated into "Who killed poetry's audience?" The
assumption behind both questions is that if American readers have turned
their backs on poetry, the poets themselves must have mnde a mistake
somewhere. Complacent critics who gauge such shifts employ popularity,
which then becomes equated w ith populism (in fact a vastly different
political enterprise), as a barometer for an art form's vitality. And while it
is easytowaxnostalgicabout a lost oral tradition and the days when poetry
appeared on the front p ages of daily newspapers, American audiences
have never been moved by poetry in the way we are told Vladimir
Mayakovsky electrified stadiums-full of the Russian masses. While Carl
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